INTRODUCTION
In an effort to support the multilevel nature of Naval Special Warfare (NSW) diving, the US Navy developed a diver-worn decompression computer named the Navy dive computer (NDC) . The NDC was created to support dives in which the diver switched back and forth between air and a rebreather (MK1 6 MOD 0) that maintained a nominal diver inspired P0 2 of 0.75 atm. The NDC was approved for use by select Naval Special Warfare commands on January 25, 20012. Newer versions of the NDC have been created 3 , including a version specifically requested by NAVSEA to support AIR diving 4 .
In order to expand the community of Navy divers approved to use the NDC, particularly to include those that routinely dive within the no-stop limits, and facilitate acceptance of the NDC by these divers, it is necessary to illustrate the benefits that can be derived from use of these devices. Ships husbandry divers, who operate in shallow water with depth excursions dictated by the nature of their tasking, constitute one class of divers for which a large benefit from NDC use is expected.
The decompression guidance provided by the NDCs is updated every second using the actual prevailing depth, and consequently differs from that obtained from conventional tables, which presume a square profile with bottom time spent at the maximum depth attained in the dive. Guidance from tables also incorporates additional safety enhancements from depth and bottom time round-ups. Thus, guidance based on actual real-time information will nearly always allow either more bottom time or less decompression obligation than guidance obtained from conventional tables. However, these bottom time increases or decompression time decreases are obtained at the cost of increased risks of decompression sickness (DCS) eliminating the built in safety factor. Records from actual ships husbandry dives afford an opportunity to examine the trade-offs between increased bottom times that would be allowed by an NDC and the associated increased DCS risks, all in the context of no-stop diving. Any such trade off should be acceptable if an NDC-prescribed no-stop limit, though longer than its corresponding limit in the Standard Air tables, generates the same level of DCS risk as the hypothetical square dive to the tabulated limit.
In summer 2004, a Navy contractor completed 25 surface-supplied air dives to perform ship's husbandry on the aircraft carrier USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN-76). Divers carried Navy Dive Computers 1 (NDCs) to record their depth-time profiles. Recorded profiles were analyzed to determine the additional no-stop dive times that would have been allowed, and the associated increased DCS risks that would have been incurred, if the NDCs had been used to control the decompression requirements for these dives.
METHODS
The present analysis makes use of operational dive profiles collected from 25 ship's husbandry dives conducted on the USS RONALD REAGAN using NDCs.
DATA
Records from NDCs were available for 23 of the 25 dives; smooth logs for these dives were also available from the contractor. For two of the 25 dives, NDCs were not used (Dives 1 and 2) neither NDC records nor smooth logs were available. The divers did not leave the surface for Dives that would have been numbers 10 and 12. A numbering error is apparent in the smooth log, as two dives (both having NDC records) are assigned the number 24, while no dive is assigned number 25. On Dives 7 and 8 the NDCs were left at depth while the divers surfaced and the computers were recovered later; the recorded profiles were truncated at the logged bottom times, and an ascent to the surface at a rate of 30 feet of seawater (fsw) per minute was appended to create corrected dive records. Table 1 categorizes the dives with respect to decompression stop requirements as prescribed by the U.S. Navy (USN) Standard Air tables 5 for the recorded max depth and bottom time and as calculated by the NDC VVAL-18 Thalmann Algorithm (NDCNVAL-18) from the recorded dive profile ( Figure 1 ). In the latter calculation, the assessment was based on whether NDCNVAL-18 prescribed decompression stops to the surface from the point in the recorded profile immediately before the recorded ascent. 
ANALYSIS
We compared the remaining no-stop time allowed under USN Standard Air Tables at the maximum recorded depth for each dive to the corresponding remaining no-stop time (RNST) at the maximum recorded depth calculated by NDCNVAL-1 8. The behavior of the NDCs for these dives was simulated with the recorded dive profiles run through the NDCNVAL-1 8 algorithm implemented on a personal computer. We calculated the RNST time for the NDCNVAL-1 8 algorithm by truncating the profile at the start of the recorded ascent to the surface and appending a descent back to the maximum depth followed by the longest time period at this depth from which a no-stop ascent to the surface could be completed at 30 fsw per minute ( Figure 2 Figure 2 . Recorded profile and its hypothetical extension at the maximum recorded depth to the no-stop limit of NDCNVAL-1 8.
The USN93 ' 7 probabilistic model was used to estimate the risks of decompression sickness (DCS) for the recorded dives and for the hypothetical profiles that included the added no-stop times at the maximum depths.
RESULTS
The recorded maximum depth was greater than the logged maximum depth for all the dives. Tables for the dives shown in Table 2 . The RNST according to NDCNVAL-1 8 and the decompression time required by the Standard Air Tables for those dives that required such decompression are given in Table 3 . To illustrate the potential influences of errors in the depth readings, this table includes entries for the calculated decompression schedule, or RNST, as if the max depth had been 10 ft shallower than recorded. NDCNVAL-1 8 would have allowed an average of 24 minutes of additional no-stop time for these dives. Table 4 gives the decompression times required by both the Standard Air Tables and NDCNVAL-1 8 for the one dive that would have required decompression using the NDC.
The amount of decompression time required by NDCNVAL-18 is less than that required by the USN Standard Air Tables. Table 4 .
Omitted decompression dive according to NDC/VVAL-18: Calculated decompression times using the NDCNVAL-18 for the recorded dive 
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To display the trade-off in increased estimated risk for the longer bottom times allowed by NDCNVAL-1 8, the USN93 model's predicted DCS (PDcs) risks for the profiles are provided in Table 5 . The predicted risks are shown for the profiles recorded by the NDCs and for profiles that have the additional allowed minutes of bottom time at the recorded maximum depth added to the end of the recorded profile. An average of 44 minutes has been added to the profiles, with a doubling of the average risk to 2.7% when the NDC!VVAL-18 algorithm is used. If the dives are pushed to the limits of the Standard Air Table, the average risk increases to 1.69%, while the risk for the seven dives requiring decompression decreases. For comparative purposes, the estimated DCS risks for 40, 50, and 60 fsw dives to the Standard Air no-stop limits are given in Table 6 . One explanation for these differences in maximum depths between the logged and recorded depths and the lack of variation in the logged depth is that the logged depths could be based on the internal pressure of the cofferdam.
The depth gauge used to control decompression was not the NDC but a separate device that may have displayed a shallower depth than that of the NDC. Depth reading differences between two accurate gauges can result from placement or from allowed sensor accuracy limits: the NDC's required accuracy is ±2 fsw shallower than 60 fsw. While the divers were working in the cofferdam, their practice was to remove the NDC data recorders and leave these in the water beneath them. As a result, the NDCs recorded depths a few fsw deeper than the divers actually experienced, this increase in depth would reduce the benefits of using the NDC when compared against the Standard Air Tables. Where the NDCs were attached to the divers and how consistent the placement was between dives are unknown. A general observation of the dive records reveals that the monotonous depth readings indicating a computer left in place does not occur at the maximum depths recorded. Tables (final column of Table 5 ), a 1 percent additional risk still remains with the use of the NDCs. This risk increase is due to the NDCs use of the actual pressure profile which removes the conservatism due to rounding up the maximum depth to a table depth to determine allowed dive duration. These risk are in line with the risks of diving the Standard Air tables at their tabulated depths for the nostop limits (See Table 6 ), and thus are considered acceptable.
CONCLUSIONS
The NDC would have permitted more no-stop time than the USN Standard Air Tables permit, but at an increased risk. This increase in risk is nominal and is acceptable for no-stop diving.
The quality of recorded dive profiles was generally good but was somewhat compromised by differences between logged and recorded maximum depths, locations of the NDC data recorders with respect to diver position during each dive, and uncertainties in pressure gauge calibrations.
Dive records and logs differ in demonstrably important ways.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To improve the quality of the acquired data, we recommend that an NEDU representative or an NEDU-trained data collection coordinator be sent to supervise operational dive data collection efforts.
